Assessing the Electoral Act Amendment Bill: Strengths, weaknesses

By Emmanuel Nicholas

By way of public announcement, the President of the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chairman of the National Assembly, Senator Godswill Akpabio, has indicated that the process to amend the Electoral Act (Amendment) Bill will be completed by the end of January 2026, with the stated objective of enshrining a definitive electoral calendar and thereby reducing uncertainty in the conduct of national elections.

Historically, both the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the National Assembly have pursued statutory reforms of electoral law in the run-up to and in the aftermath of general elections. Such reform initiatives are iterative in nature, aimed at addressing recurring defects and evolving governance needs.

The Electoral Act (Amendment) Bill 2025 was the subject of a joint public hearing by the Senate and House Committees on Electoral Matters on 13 October 2025. The proceedings were characterised by extensive stakeholder engagement from political parties, civil society organisations, development partners, INEC, and legal practitioners, reflecting the Bill’s public law significance.

The Bill, as introduced, seeks to repeal the existing Electoral Act No. 13 of 2022 and enact a consolidated Electoral Act, 2025. This represents a legislative repeal-and-re-enactment exercise intended to provide a comprehensive statutory framework rather than piecemeal amendments.

The stated policy objectives of the proposed statute include impartiality, enhanced transparency, strengthened administrative independence for INEC, accelerated litigation timelines, and measures designed to expand voter registration and participation—objectives which, if realised, would advance electoral integrity and democratic consolidation.

One of the cornerstone reforms is the prescription of a clear timetable for electoral events (Section 27(5–7)), mandating that presidential and gubernatorial elections be held not later than 185 days before the expiration of incumbents’ tenures.

Strength: This provision aims to ensure that electoral disputes and litigation are finalised well in advance of transfer-of-power deadlines, thereby reducing the risk of constitutional limbo.

Weakness: Rigid calendaring may constrain remedial flexibility in the event of force majeure, legal challenges to the timetable itself, or delays in electoral logistics.

The Bill proposes that possession of the Permanent Voter Card (PVC) will no longer be compulsory for voting, on the basis that the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) does not depend on the PVC microchip and that registered voters may download and print a voter’s card when required.

Strength: This could broaden access to voting by lowering a technical barrier for voters who lack physical PVCs.

Weakness: It raises questions of identity authentication, chain-of-custody integrity, document forgery risks, and the adequacy of BVAS safeguards for offline or print-based credentials.

Political parties would be required to submit certified lists of candidates not less than 210 days before election day, and only candidates who emerged from valid primaries would be accepted.

Strength: This extended lead time is intended to enhance certainty, facilitate vetting, and reduce last-minute substitutions.

Weakness: Such a requirement may curtail intra-party democratic dynamism and create scheduling pressures for parties whose internal dispute-resolution processes remain unresolved.

The amendment narrows pre-election litigation by limiting challenges to the jurisdiction where the dispute arose or to the Federal High Court in Abuja.

Strength: Jurisdictional clarity may expedite the disposal of disputes and prevent multiplicity of actions across jurisdictions.

Weakness: Restricting forum choice could impede access to justice for aggrieved parties located far from Abuja and may raise constitutional questions regarding the right to fair hearing and access to a convenient forum.

The insertion of the National Identification Number (NIN) as part of voter registration requirements (Section 10(2)(c)) seeks to harmonise biometric identification across public registers.

Strength: NIN integration promises improved data integrity, reduced multiple registrations, and enhanced identity verification.

Weakness: Reliance on NIN risks disenfranchisement where enrolment remains incomplete and raises data-protection and privacy concerns if statutory safeguards and due process are not rigorously defined.

The Bill recognises the voting rights of inmates (Sections 12(1)(d) and 12(2)), subject to INEC making appropriate arrangements for registration and participation.

Strength: This inclusivity measure aligns with human-rights norms and enfranchises a marginalised population.

Weakness: Practical difficulties in securing correctional facilities, ensuring ballot secrecy, and mitigating undue influence may complicate implementation and necessitate detailed procedural regulations.

Provisions for mandatory early voting (Section 44) are introduced to facilitate participation by voters who, for stipulated reasons, cannot vote on the designated election day.

Strength: Early voting can increase turnout and accommodate voters with mobility or scheduling constraints.

Weakness: Without clear procedural safeguards, early voting could be susceptible to manipulation, chain-of-custody lapses, or opaque tabulation procedures that undermine confidence in final results.

The Bill makes electronic transmission of results compulsory (Section 60(5)), reflecting a statutory move to leverage technology for real-time transparency.

Strength: Electronic transmission can fast-track results collation, minimise human interference, and provide an auditable trail.

Weakness: Mandatory electronic transmission introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities, dependence on network infrastructure, and potential single-point failures; mitigating measures and contingency plans must therefore be expressly provided.

To address perennial funding bottlenecks, Section 3(3) mandates the early release of funds to INEC to ensure timely election preparation.

Strength: Early appropriations could remove a principal operational impediment and enable adequate planning.

Weakness: In the absence of robust accountability mechanisms, early fund releases could increase the risk of misappropriation or politicised interference, underscoring the need for strict fiscal oversight.

Complementing funding reforms, Section 5 obliges INEC to submit audited financial statements within six months after the end of each financial year.

Strength: This enhances financial transparency and facilitates parliamentary and public scrutiny, reinforcing fiscal probity.

Weakness: Audit timelines must be realistic given INEC’s operational scope; failure to meet statutory deadlines without sanctions may dilute the provision’s effectiveness.

The legislature is pursuing a concomitant constitutional amendment to transfer the statutory power to set election timelines from entrenched provisions of the 1999 Constitution to the Electoral Act, thereby granting the National Assembly and INEC greater flexibility.

Strength: Vesting timetable authority in ordinary legislation allows responsive adjustments to administrative realities.

Weakness: Reducing constitutional entrenchment may raise separation-of-powers concerns and could enable opportunistic manipulation of election timelines unless subject to stringent procedural safeguards or supermajority requirements.

The Bill contemplates the re-inclusion of statutory delegates’ voting rights in party primaries, a proposal ultimately downplayed owing to cost and logistical considerations.

Instead, lawmakers preferred limiting participation to elected delegates while increasing the delegate quota from 30 to 50 per local government area.

Strength: Expanding elected delegates represents a compromise that preserves intra-party representativeness without the logistical burden of reinstating statutory delegates.

Weakness: This approach may still privilege party elites, complicate grassroots representation, and generate disputes over delegate selection and operational fairness.

If enacted, the amendments would likely result in an earlier election calendar, with presidential and gubernatorial elections slated for November 2026—approximately six months before the expiration of incumbents’ tenures.

Strength: The schedule seeks to ensure that electoral disputes are resolved prior to the statutorily fixed handover date of 29 May 2027, reducing transitional uncertainty.

Weakness: Accelerating the electoral timeline places increased logistical demands on INEC and political parties and may reduce the time available for thorough candidate vetting and civic education.

The Bill expressly targets weaknesses in the enforcement of electoral offences and seeks to strengthen statutory penalties and investigatory powers.

Strength: Firmer sanctions and clearer offence definitions can deter electoral malfeasance and strengthen the rule of law.

Weakness: Effectiveness will depend on the capacity and political independence of enforcement institutions; without institutional reform, increased penalties may not yield improved compliance.

Campaign-finance and political-party operation reforms embedded in the Bill aim to improve transparency through reporting obligations and funding limits.

Strength: Calibrated campaign-finance regulation can reduce the corrosive influence of illicit money and increase public confidence.

Weakness: Onerous compliance costs and monitoring challenges may disadvantage smaller parties and independent candidates unless proportionality and capacity-building measures are incorporated.

Several provisions are intended to enhance the operational independence of INEC, including statutory protections and funding arrangements.

Strength: Institutional insulation from partisan interference is fundamental to impartial election administration.

Weakness: Statutory pronouncements alone are insufficient; effective independence requires cultural change, adequate resources, and enforceable safeguards against executive encroachment.

The Bill’s emphasis on accelerated litigation timelines and jurisdictional clarity seeks to ensure finality of electoral disputes within constitutionally compatible periods.

Strength: Expedited judicial processes can reduce prolonged uncertainty and enable the timely installation of officeholders.

Weakness: Compressed timelines may strain judicial capacity, impair the depth of adjudication, and inadvertently curtail litigants’ ability to gather evidence, thereby affecting substantive fairness.

Implementation risks remain significant. Harmonising BVAS operations with non-PVC credentials, integrating NIN databases, securing electronic transmission, facilitating early and inmate voting, and managing delegate adjustments will require detailed secondary legislation, administrative guidelines, voter-education campaigns, and sustained investment in technology and human capital.

Strength: The Bill anticipates comprehensive reform and, if adequately resourced, could modernise Nigeria’s electoral architecture.

Weakness: Institutional capacity gaps, funding shortfalls, and weak stakeholder coordination could undermine legislative intent and erode public trust.

In sum, the proposed Electoral Act 2025 presents a blend of progressive reforms—enhanced transparency, funding predictability, expanded enfranchisement, and timetable clarity—juxtaposed with legal and operational risks relating to identity integration, technological dependency, compressed timelines, and potential constraints on access to justice.

The ultimate efficacy of the amendments will depend on meticulous drafting, faithful implementation, proportional safeguards, and sustained multi-stakeholder oversight.

The legislative process continues. Once both chambers of the National Assembly pass the Bill, it will be transmitted to the President for assent, after which INEC will be required to revise its timetables and operational plans accordingly.

From a legal-drafting and governance perspective, it is recommended that the final statute include transitional provisions, precise definitions, enumerated procedural safeguards, robust data-protection clauses, contingency protocols for technological failures, and enforceable oversight mechanisms to mitigate identified risks while realising the reform’s intended benefits.

This overview is written by Emmanuel Nicholas, who holds a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) and a Master of Laws (LLM), with postgraduate specialisation in legal drafting.