Peace pacts with bandits in Nigeria — strategic compromise or dangerous precedent?

By Okechukwu Nwanguma

The recent peace deal between the Katsina State Government and a dozen leaders of armed criminal gangs—locally dubbed “bandits”—has reignited debate over the use of negotiated settlements in addressing violent crime.

While the surrender of weapons and release of hostages is welcome news for victims and weary communities, the deeper implications of such an accord demand sober scrutiny, especially in the context of international best practices and Nigeria’s troubled history with similar efforts.

The search for peace amidst protracted insecurity

The northwestern region of Nigeria has, for over a decade, endured waves of violence stemming from loosely organized criminal networks. Unlike the ideologically driven Boko Haram or ISWAP insurgents of the northeast, these bandits are primarily motivated by financial gains—kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, and extortion. Yet, their increasingly sophisticated operations and recent flirtations with jihadist elements signal a dangerous evolution.

In this context, the Katsina deal—brokered after the bandits themselves initiated overtures—might appear to be a pragmatic step toward de-escalation. According to officials, the bandits renounced violence, released 17 hostages, and surrendered arms. The question is: at what cost, and to what effect?

International best practices: justice or appeasement?

Globally, crime-fighting strategies rooted in accountability, community trust, and robust law enforcement have proven more effective than ad hoc pacification deals. In Colombia, peace negotiations with armed groups like the FARC were anchored in disarmament, truth-telling, and transitional justice—not mere verbal commitments.

South Africa’s post-apartheid peace process included strong institutional frameworks and civil society participation. By contrast, Nigeria’s peace pacts with bandits often occur in opaque settings, with no clear framework for truth, justice, or rehabilitation.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) warns against granting impunity to criminal groups in the name of short-term peace. Without guarantees of justice for victims and systems to monitor compliance, such pacts risk emboldening perpetrators, undermining public confidence in the rule of law, and creating a “crime pays” incentive structure.

Lessons from the past: Nigeria’s checkered history with amnesty

Nigeria is no stranger to negotiated settlements with non-state armed actors. In the Niger Delta, the 2009 Presidential Amnesty Programme brought relative calm after years of militancy.

However, the program, while successful in the short term, eventually became synonymous with rent-seeking, patronage, and a lack of structural reform. It failed to address the root grievances or reintegrate ex-militants into meaningful economic roles.

In Katsina and neighboring Kaduna, past peace pacts with bandits have collapsed under the weight of mistrust, bad faith, and lack of enforcement. Communities that welcomed “repentant” bandits often became targets again after the lull ended. The fact that authorities previously ruled out negotiations due to repeated betrayals raises a red flag about the durability of the current deal.

Between soft diplomacy and firm security

The argument that one must not negotiate from a position of weakness remains valid. It is commendable that Katsina’s government, under Governor Radda, has complemented military efforts with the establishment of the Katsina Community Watch Corps. But if such security efforts are to be effective, they must not be undermined by non-transparent bargains that risk legitimizing criminality.

Peace, when offered by perpetrators of violence, should not be automatically embraced without structure. There must be clear terms: disarmament, demobilization, verification, and a system of community-driven monitoring. Rehabilitation must include psychological assessment, vocational training, and reintegration programs, especially for lower-level operatives. Crucially, victims’ voices must be included—there can be no real peace without justice.

The need for a national framework

It is high time Nigeria developed a national framework for negotiated disengagements with criminal elements, similar to transitional justice models used in conflict zones. Such a framework should:

Set minimum conditions for any peace talks, including verified disarmament and community consultation, mandate oversight by human rights institutions, civil society, and security agencies, and ensure that amnesty does not equal impunity, with clear guidelines on prosecutable offenses and reintegrate individuals.

Involve affected communities in decision-making, ensuring that peace deals are not imposed from above, and invest in post-conflict reconstruction, including psychosocial support for victims and ex-combatants alike.

In the final analysis

The Katsina deal may offer temporary relief, but without accountability and transparency, it risks repeating past failures. In the words of peace theorist Johan Galtung, “Peace is not the absence of violence; it is the presence of justice.” Nigeria must be careful not to trade one for the other.

If this deal is to be a turning point, it must not be a shortcut to quiet, but a bridge to sustainable peace—rooted in justice, monitored by law and owned by the people.